Previous research has estimated that food insecure children are more likely to suffer from a wide array of negative health outcomes than food secure children, leading many to claim that alleviating food insecurity would lead to better health outcomes. Identifying the causal impacts is problematic, however, given endogenous selection into food security status and potential mismeasurement of true food security status. Using recently developed nonparametric bounding methods and data from the 2001-2006 National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES), we assess what can be identified about the effects of food insecurity on child health outcomes in the presence of nonrandom selection and nonclassical measurement error. Under relatively weak monotonicity assumptions, we can identify that food security has a statistically significant positive impact on good general health and being a healthy weight. Our work suggests that previous research has more likely underestimated than overestimated the causal impacts of food insecurity on health. Abstract. Previous research has estimated that food insecure children are more likely to su¤er from a wide array of negative health outcomes than food secure children, leading many to claim that alleviating food insecurity would lead to better health outcomes. Identifying the causal impacts is problematic, however, given endogenous selection into food security status and potential mismeasurement of true food security status. Using recently developed nonparametric bounding methods and data from the 2001-2006 National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES), we assess what can be identi…ed about the e¤ects of food insecurity on child health outcomes in the presence of nonrandom selection and nonclassical measurement error. Under relatively weak monotonicity assumptions, we can identify that food security has a statistically signi…cant positive impact on good general health and being a healthy weight. Our work suggests that previous research has more likely underestimated than overestimated the causal impacts of food insecurity on health.
Introduction
Positive associations between food insecurity and poor health outcomes among children have been widely documented. Previous research, spanning numerous academic studies, has found that children in households su¤ering from food insecurity are more likely to have poor health (Cook et These consistently negative health …ndings emerge from a variety of data sources, employ a variety of statistical techniques, and appear to be robust to di¤erent measures of food insecurity.
Based on this evidence, most authors conclude that e¤orts to reduce food insecurity would lead to improvements in these health outcomes. That is, if children in food insecure households were to become food secure, they would be expected to achieve health outcomes like those in observationally similar food secure households. The central vehicle for helping alleviate food insecurity among children is the Food Stamp Program, now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, p.7). This program directly augments a household's resources available for purchasing food. Prior research has suggested that SNAP leads to reductions in food insecurity (e.g., Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001 ). Other policies, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and educational programs to assist families with food budgeting, may indirectly alleviate food insecurity. More generally, any program that expands a low-income household's budget opportunities may lead to less food insecurity.
Irrespective of how policymakers pursue these improvements, the general conclusion that efforts to reduce food insecurity would lead to improvements in health outcomes is tenuous for two main reasons. First, food insecurity is not randomly distributed among the population. Even after controlling for characteristics that can be observed in the data, there may remain important unobserved factors that lead some children to be simultaneously at higher risk of being food insecure and of being in poor health. Due to these unobserved in ‡uences, a policy prescription that would alleviate food insecurity among these children, even if worthwhile on other grounds, might not lead to the predicted improvements in health status.
Second, this literature presumes that food insecurity is accurately measured in household surveys. However, food insecurity status may be mismeasured for a variety of reasons. Food insecurity is partially subjective, and there may be divergences between how experts and various households interpret the survey questions (Gundersen and Ribar, 2004) . Even if food insecurity were objectively de…ned, some parents might misreport being food secure if they feel ashamed about heading a household in which their children are not getting enough food to eat (Hamelin et al., 2002) .
Alternatively, some households might misreport being food insecure if they believe that reporting otherwise could jeopardize their eligibility for an assistance program -especially one that provides food assistance, like SNAP. More generally, validation studies consistently reveal large degrees of response error in popular surveys, even for variables thought to be relatively objective. In an important survey of the causes and consequences of measurement error, Bound et al. (2001) conclude that response error constitutes a serious problem for applied econometric work across a wide range of topics. Moreover, they …nd little reason to believe that such errors tend to occur randomly. Instead, they provide evidence that response errors tend to be correlated with the underlying variable of interest and common socioeconomic attributes. Consistent with this concern, Black et al. (2003) …nd that more than a third of respondents to the U.S. Census reporting a professional degree have no such degree, with widely varying patterns of false positive and false negative reports across demographic groups. A priori, there seems to be good reason to consider the consequences of at least some small degree of misclassi…cation in food insecurity responses. Even small degrees of classi…cation error can lead to large degrees of uncertainty for inferences. 1 In this paper, we reconsider what can be learned about the e¤ects of food security on child health outcomes when formally accounting for the uncertainty created by unobserved counterfactuals and questions about the reliability of self-reported food insecurity status. In the absence of strong (and untestable) assumptions on counterfactual outcomes and the reporting error process, we cannot fully identify the impact of food security on health. Nevertheless, we can provide informative bounds on these impacts using relatively weak nonparametric assumptions. Our analysis applies and extends recent partial identi…cation bounding methods that allow researchers to consider relatively weak nonparametric assumptions (see, e.g., Manski, 1995; Molinari, 2008 Survey (NHANES), we assess the impact of food insecurity on the health of children. We focus on two key measures studied in previous work: a child's general health status and obesity status.
In the next section, we describe the central variables of interest in this paper -food insecurity, general health outcomes, and obesity -followed by a description of the 2001-2006 NHANES. In Section 3, we highlight the statistical identi…cation problems created by selection issues and the potential unreliability of self-reported food insecurity. We then show how the average treatment e¤ects of interest can be partially identi…ed under various assumptions about the classi…cation error and selection processes. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Concepts and Data

Food Insecurity
The extent of food insecurity in the United States has become a well-publicized issue of concern to policymakers and program administrators. In 2007, 11:1% of the U.S. population reported that they su¤ered from food insecurity at some time during the previous year (Nord et al., 2008) . These households were uncertain of having, or unable to acquire, enough food for all their members because they had insu¢ cient money or other resources. For about 4:1% of the population, the degree of food insecurity was severe enough to be recorded as very low food security. For households with children, the reported levels were higher: 15:8% and 4:7%, respectively. As with other determinants of health status (e.g., having health insurance), food insecurity status depends on the ability to a¤ord adequate amounts of food. In 2007, households with incomes below 185% of the poverty line had food insecurity rates over …ve times higher than those with incomes below this threshold (Nord et al., 2008 ; Table 2 ). Food insecurity is often related to nonpecuniary factors as well, such as …nancial management skills and nutrition knowledge.
These o¢ cial food insecurity rates, de…ned over a 12 month period, are calculated based on households'responses to a series of 18 questions posed in the Core Food Security Module (CFSM) for families with children. 2 Each question is designed to capture some aspect of food insecurity and, for some questions, the frequency with which it manifests itself. Examples include "I worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more" (the least severe outcome); "Did you or the other adults in your household ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because there wasn't enough money for food?" and "Did a child in the household ever not eat for a full day because you couldn't a¤ord enough food?" (the most severe outcome). A complete listing of the food insecurity questions is presented in Table 1 . 3 Following o¢ cial de…nitions, we classify a household with children as food insecure if it responds a¢ rmatively to three or more questions in the CFSM; otherwise, it classi…ed as food secure. We also consider two other measures of food insecurity, both detailed in the annual report on food insecurity in the United States (Nord et al., 2008) . The …rst classi…es a household as food insecure with hunger (called "very low food security" since 2006) if it responds a¢ rmatively to eight or more of the questions. The second classi…es a household as marginally food secure (or at risk of food insecurity) if it responds a¢ rmatively to at least one question. Our primary analysis employs the standard food insecurity measure, but we consider the other two thresholds in ancillary sensitivity analysis.
Central to this paper is the possibility that food insecurity is mismeasured in household surveys. Beyond the issues raised above, Gundersen and Kreider (2008) provide evidence that some households do not answer the CFSM questions consistently. They exploit the ordered nature of the food insecurity questions and …nd at least one inconsistency for 6:1% of the sample. 4 Of course, the presence or absence of such inconsistencies cannot by itself determine the reliability of a household's aggregate food insecurity classi…cation. The presence of inconsistencies is not necessarily pivotal in determining the aggregate classi…cation, and food insecurity can be misclassi…ed even if the house- 2 For families without children and for one-person households, a subset of 10 questions are posed. 3 Responses to individual questions from the CFSM are suppressed for con…dentiality reasons in the NHANES. To see prevalence rates for a similar sample from the Current Population Survey, see Gundersen and Kreider (2008) . 4 For example, it would be expected that if a household responded a¢ rmatively to "Child skipped meal due to lack of money" (item 16 in Table 1 ), the respondent should also respond a¢ rmatively to "Child was hungry" (item 14) and to "Child not eating enough" (item 9).
hold always reports consistently. Still, the signi…cant fraction of inconsistencies provides one source of concern even prior to considering the other aforementioned sources of potential measurement error. . This work has used a variety of data sets and methods. In common to these papers is an assumption that reports of food insecurity are classi…ed accurately.
Health
In this paper, we divide childhood weight status into two categories: (1) healthy weight and (2) overweight or obese. 5 A child is in the former category if his or her body mass index (BMI) (kg=m 2 ) falls below the 85th percentile for age and gender and in the latter category otherwise. These percentiles were established by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In ancillary analyses we compare children who are obese (i.e., at or above the 95th percentile for BMI) with children who are overweight (but not obese) or healthy weight.
General Health
Our second health outcome is the general health of the child as reported by the mother. This measure has been widely used as a measure of child health (e.g., Case Based on parents' responses, a child's health using this measure is categorized as excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. In this paper, we combine these general health categories into two categories: (1) excellent, very good, or good and (2) fair or poor. The former we call "good health or better". In the ancillary analyses, we consider two di¤erent comparisons: excellent health compared with the remaining categories and very good or excellent health compared with the remaining categories. demographic, socioeconomic, dietary, and health-related questions with components consisting of medical and dental examinations, physiological measurements, and laboratory tests. Of particular relevance to this study, food insecurity is calculated using the full set of questions in the CFSM as described above, 6 the child's height and weight were measured with an automated data-collection system by a trained technician in the NHANES mobile examination center, and the child's general health is based on parental reports. Since food insecurity is rare among households above 200% of the poverty line (Nord et al., 2008), we limit our sample to households with incomes below this threshold. Our sample contains 6; 056 children. 6 For con…dentiality reasons, however, the responses to individual questions are suppressed in the NHANES data.
Data
Identi…cation
The central goal of this paper is to learn about the e¤ect of food security on (a) whether a child is in good or better health and (b) whether a child is a healthy weight. Our treatment e¤ects approach considers the following thought experiment: To what extent might expected health outcomes di¤er under a hypothetical treatment that would make food insecure households food secure, without the treatment a¤ecting health status through other avenues? To this end, we consider what can be known about the Average Treatment E¤ect (AT E),
under various assumptions, where H = 1 denotes a "good health" outcome (e.g., the child is a healthy weight), F S = 1 if a child is truly food secure, 7 and F S = 0 if a child is truly food insecure. The ATE reveals how the mean health outcome would di¤er if all low-income children were food secure versus the mean outcome if all low-income children were food insecure. Instead of observing F S , we observe a self-reported counterpart F S. A latent variable Z indicates whether a report is accurate: Z = 1 if F S = F S, with Z = 0 otherwise. In the absence of measurement error, F S can be replaced with F S. 8 Two forms of uncertainty arise when one assesses the ATE. First, even if F S were observed for all children (i.e., there were no conceptual or practical measurement issues), the outcome H(1) is counterfactual for all children who were food insecure. Similarly, the outcome H(0) is counterfactual for all children who were food secure. A statistical "selection" problem arises in that households become food secure or food insecure based in part on factors unobserved to the researcher. Thus, for example, the mean health outcomes of the currently food insecure, should they become food secure, may not re ‡ect the mean health outcomes of the currently food secure. Second, true food insecurity status is not observed. Even if all households respond accurately to survey questions, the state of being food insecure is conceptually di¢ cult to measure. We refer to this issue as the 7 Food insecurity is de…ned at the household level but, for simplicity of exposition, we refer to a child being food secure or food insecure. 8 For ease of notation, we leave implicit any conditioning variables. We focus on bounding treatment e¤ects for the population of low-income households with children as a whole, but it is straightforward to condition on any observed subpopulations of interest. One might loosely interpret H(F S) as a reduced form health production function, though our approach does not require that we condition on other attributes. Note that we are not estimating a regression, and there are no regression orthogonality conditions to be satis…ed. classi…cation error problem. 9 Existing research on the e¤ects of food security on health outcomes has not addressed either of these identi…cation problems. In what follows, we …rst focus on the selection problem and then assess the additional uncertainty created by potentially misclassi…ed food insecurity status. 10 
Selection
To illustrate the selection problem, the …rst component of Equation (1) can be written as:
where we denote H (1) H(F S = 1) and H(0) H(F S = 0). For the moment, assume that reports of food security are known to be accurate such that F S is observed. In this case, we can identify P (F S = 1) and P (F S = 0), the fractions of children who are food secure and food insecure, respectively, and P [H(1) = 1jF S = 1], the probability of a favorable health outcome for food secure children. What is not identi…ed, however, is the counterfactual probability of a favorable health outcome for food insecure children if they were to become food secure,
Absent other information, this value could lie anywhere between 0 and 1. Taking these extreme cases, we can bound Equation (2) as follows:
which reduces to
Each of the terms in these bounds is identi…ed by the observed data. We can analogously bound the quantity P [H(0) = 1]. Taking the di¤erence between the upper bound on P [H(1) = 1] and the lower bound on P [H(0) = 1] obtains a sharp upper bound on AT E, and analogously a sharp lower bound (Manski, 1995) :
AT E M anski
These bounds have a width of 1. To obtain these bounds, Manski (1995) presumes that all variables are measured accurately. Con…dence intervals around AT E can be computed using methods developed in Imbens and Manski (2004) .
The bounds in Equation (3) can be narrowed by making assumptions about the relationship between food security and health outcomes. Under the strong assumption that selection is exogenous, for example, one can point-identify P [H(F S = j) = 1] as equal to P (H = 1jF S = j) for j = 1; 0 (see Equation (2)) since, by exogeneity,
In this case, the average treatment e¤ect is identi…ed as
an observed quantity in the absence of measurement error since, in that case, F S is observed.
In lieu of the exogeneity assumption, we consider the identifying power of various combinations of three types of weaker monotonicity assumptions: monotone treatment response (MTR), monotone treatment selection (MTS), and a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) restriction. We discuss each assumption in turn.
Monotone Treatment Response (MTR)
For the parts of our analysis that impose MTR, we assume that becoming food secure would not lead to a reduction in a child's health status. Formally, we assume:
where i denotes the particular child. Under this assumption, it is readily apparent that AT E is constrained to be nonnegative. Using the law of total probability, it can also be shown that
For the general health outcome, the MTR assumption seems relatively innocuous. At least in the short run, it is di¢ cult to imagine how becoming food secure would lead to worsened general children's health. With respect to the healthy weight outcome, the MTR assumption is perhaps more tenuous because potential increases in caloric intake could result in weight gains. Of course, most increases in weight are not associated with obesity, and the previous literature has found that food insecurity can lead to higher probabilities of being overweight due to ( lead to weight problems in the short run and poorer general health outcomes in the long run. We impose the MTR assumption in deriving our baseline results, but we make transparent how the results vary when the assumption is discarded.
Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS)
The MTS assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000) places structure on the selection mechanism through which children become food secure or insecure. The literature on food security suggests that food secure children are advantaged compared with food insecure children across several economic and demographic characteristics (Nord et al., 2008 conditional on the food security treatment. In that case, the following MTS restrictions hold:
Under the MTS assumption, it can be shown that
and
If F S is observed, then the right-hand-side quantities P (H = 1jF S = 1) and P (H = 1jF S = 0) are known. If instead F S is measured with error, then bounds on P (H = 1jF S = 1) and P (H = 1jF S = 0), derived below, serve as bounds on, respectively, P [H(1) = 1] and P [H(0) = 1].
Monotone Instrumental Variables (MIV)
Finally, we consider the identifying power of a monotone instrumental variables (MIV) assumption …rst analyzed by Manski and Pepper (2000) . In our application, we use the CPS-de…ned "income-to-poverty" ratio as the monotone instrument. This ratio measures a household's income relative to the o¢ cial poverty line. Under the MIV assumption, we impose the restriction that the probability of being healthy conditional on food security status is weakly larger for children in higher-income households than in lower-income households. Letting v represent the instrument, the MIV assumption implies the following inequalities: 11
As noted above, the literature on general health outcomes and childhood obesity has demonstrated that people with higher incomes tend to have better health outcomes. This mean monotonicity condition in Equation (5) is weaker than the standard mean independence instrumental variables (IV) assumption. Under mean independence, the inequalities in Equation (5) would be replaced with equalities. It is di¢ cult to …nd instruments for food insecurity status that would satisfy mean independence, so we impose the weaker MIV assumption that has less identifying power. Unlike the standard IV assumption, the MIV assumption does not imply any exclusion restriction; the mean health outcome is allowed to vary (monotonically) with income though avenues distinct from the impact of income on food security.
Across 12 ordered income categories (about 500 children per group), the estimation procedure enforces a restriction that any derived lower bound on P [H(F S = j) = 1] (based on the particular set of other maintained assumptions) for a higher income group must be no smaller than the lower bound derived for a lower income group. Similarly, any derived upper bound on
for a lower income group must be no larger than the upper bound derived for a higher income group.
Estimation details are provided in Kreider and Pepper (2007) where they derive an estimator that accounts for …nite sample bias in Manski and Pepper's (2000) standard MIV estimator. 12 In other applications, the MIV assumption has been e¤ective in substantially narrowing the range of uncertainty about treatment e¤ects (e.g., Kreider and Hill, 2009).
Bounding the ATE in the Presence of Classi…cation Error
Given the selection problem, the average treatment e¤ect cannot be identi…ed based on the data alone. Even if the relevant variables were known to be measured accurately, the presence of unknown counterfactuals precludes point identi…cation; AT E can only be bounded. When we also allow for 1 1 Under the MTS assumption, the treatment F S is itself an MIV. 1 2 As discussed by Manski and Pepper (2000) , their standard estimator is consistent but biased in …nite samples.
classi…cation errors in reported food security status, the bounds naturally widen. In this section, we show how to bound AT E under various assumptions about the selection process and about the nature and degree of classi…cation error.
Exogenous selection
We begin with the special case of exogenous selection into food security status using Equation (4) . In this case, we are abstracting away from uncertainty about counterfactuals; all identi…cation uncertainty comes from uncertainty about the measurement of F S . To assess the impact of classi…cation error in this exogenous selection setting, we draw from the approach in Gundersen and Kreider (2008). Let denote the fraction of false positive and false negative food security reports, respectively, among non-healthy children.
Before considering any structure on the pattern of false positives and false negatives, we begin by assessing identi…cation given a limit on the potential degree of misclassi…cation. Following Horowitz and Manski (1995) and much of the subsequent literature, we can study how identi…cation of unknown parameters varies with the con…dence in the data. Consider an upper bound, q, on the fraction of inaccurate food security classi…cations:
(i ) P (Z = 0)
This assumption incorporates a researcher's beliefs about the potential degree of data corruption. If q equals 0 (as is implicitly assumed in all previous work on relationships between food security and health outcomes), then P (H = 1jF S ) is point-identi…ed because all food security reports are assumed to be accurate. At the opposite extreme, a researcher unwilling to place any limit on the potential degree of reporting error can set q equal to 1. In that case, there is no hope of learning anything about P (H = 1jF S ) without constraining the pattern of reporting errors. In any event, the sensitivity of inferences on P (H = 1jF S ) can be examined by varying the value of q between 0 and 1. To illustrate identi…cation decay in the presence of even small amounts of food security classi…cation errors, our empirical analysis focuses on values of q between 0 and 0:05.
Regardless of any subsequent assumptions on the pattern of reporting errors, the following constraints must hold:
(ii ) 0
For example, the fraction of children experiencing negative health outcomes in households falsely classi…ed as being food secure obviously cannot exceed the fraction of children experiencing negative health outcomes in households classi…ed as being food secure.
Worst-case bounds on P (H = 1jF S ) can be obtained by …nding the extrema subject to the restrictions on Let P (Z = 0) q. Under exogenous selection, the fraction of positive health outcomes if all children were to become food secure is bounded sharply as follows:
using the values
min fq; p 11 g if p 11 p 01 q 0 max f0; q p 00 g otherwise 1 3 Corrupt sampling refers to an environment where nothing is known about the pattern of reporting errors. from worst-case upper bounds on P (H = 1jF S = 1) and P (H = 1jF S = 0). Intuitively, the bounds converge to P (H = 1jF S = 1) as q goes to 0. Increasing q may widen the bounds over some ranges of q but not others, and the rate of identi…cation decay can be highly nonlinear as q
increases (especially for larger values of q).
These corrupt sampling bounds can be narrowed, sometimes dramatically, by imposing restrictions on the patterns of false positives and false negatives. We focus on an "orthogonal errors"
assumption that food security classi…cation errors occur independently of whether the household is truly food secure: 14
In this case, the false positive and false negative classi…cation errors must satisfy the constraint:
As revealed in our empirical results, this orthogonality assumption has substantial identifying power. While this restriction cannot be tested, it is obviously weaker than the standard assumption in previous work that food insecurity status is reported without error. We cannot obtain closedform bounds on AT E for this case, but we can obtain sharp bounds by imposing this constraint using numerical methods. 15 1 4 Many studies have assumed that classi…cation errors arise independently of the variable's true value (see Molinari (2008) for a discussion). Bollinger (1996) , for example, discusses the possibility that a worker's true union status has no in ‡uence on whether union status is misreported in the data. Kreider and Pepper (2008) consider the identifying assumption that, among certain types of respondents, misreported disability status does not depend on true disability status. Gundersen and Kreider (2008) and consider a "no false positives"identifying assumption that respondents may fail to report receiving food stamps but not falsely claim to receive food stamps. 1 5 Our Gauss program is available upon request.
Endogenous selection
When selection into food security status is endogenous, the average treatment e¤ect is no longer constrained by the bounds in Equation (4). To derive corrupt sampling bounds for this case in the presence of classi…cation error, we begin by writing
We can set P [H(1) = 1jF S = 0] equal to 0 for the lower bound and equal to 1 for the upper bound since this quantity is unrestricted. Then we can write
To obtain the worst-case lower bound, we must set 1 = 0 and As above, these bounds can be narrowed by imposing restrictions on the patterns of food insecurity classi…cation errors. Using numerical methods to impose constraint (vi ), our empirical analysis considers the case where classi…cation errors arise independently of true food insecurity status (i.e., under the assumption of orthogonal errors). In presenting our results, we consider the additional identifying power of the MTR, MTS, and MIV assumptions.
Empirical results
We now turn to our empirical results. We begin with the case of exogenous selection into food security status. Figure 1A As revealed in the …gure, however, even tiny degrees of uncertainty about true food insecurity status are su¢ cient to overturn the conclusion that food secure children are more likely to be in good health. Under corrupt sampling, we can no longer identify the sign of AT E Exogenous (even prior to considering standard errors) if we allow for the possibility that even 1:5% of the food insecurity status classi…cations are in error. Imposing the orthogonal errors assumption makes little di¤erence. Under this restriction on the pattern of errors, we still cannot identify whether food secure children are more likely to be healthy if up to 2:1% of the classi…cations may be in error.
Starting at q = 0, a one percentage point increase in the degree of uncertainty about the reliability of food insecurity classi…cations (increase in q), given orthogonal errors, is associated with an additional 8:2 percentage point increase in uncertainty about AT E Exogenous . By the time we allow for the possibility of a 5% error rate, we …nd that children in food secure households may be up to 14:2 percentage points more likely to be in good health than their food insecure counterparts under orthogonal errors -or they may be up to 9:0 percentage points less likely to be in good health. This 23:2 percentage point range of uncertainty about the ATE is striking, especially since it abstracts away from additional uncertainty associated with sampling variability, the selection mechanism, and the possibility that health status might also be mismeasured. Very small degrees of food security classi…cation errors can result in severe degrees of uncertainty about the relationships between food security and health. can be known about the fraction of respondents that would have a healthy weight. In the data, 67%
are classi…ed as being a healthy weight; if all children were to become food secure, this outcome could range from 45:5% to 78:9%.
To make tighter inferences about P [H(1) = 1] and AT E, stronger assumptions must be imposed.
As seen in Figure 3 , the bounds on AT E narrow dramatically after imposing the MTR and MTS monotonicity assumptions. When q = 0, the fraction of households that would be healthy if all children were food secure, P [H ( After allowing for possible classi…cation errors in food security status, the potential for strong positive e¤ects of food security on health rises substantially. For example, Figure 3A shows that the upper bound on AT E for good health rises to 14:2 percentage points under orthogonal errors, and 19:4 points under arbitrary errors, if even 5% of the food insecurity classi…cations may be inaccurate. Thus, our results reveal that e¤orts to limit uncertainty about the reliability of food insecurity data can have important consequences for limiting uncertainty about the e¤ects of food security on health status. If we impose the MTS assumption but discard the MTR assumption, the upper bounds in Figure 3 would remain the same but the lower bounds would fall to the Figure 2 lower bounds.
We now turn to the case when we combine the MTR-MTS assumptions with the MIV assumption. In this case, the average treatment e¤ects are identi…ed to be strictly positive. Recall that the MIV assumption imposes the restriction that, on average, health status does not decline with a family's income-to-poverty ratio. The "no MIV LB"and "no MIV UB"bounds depicted in Figure   4 reproduce the Figure 3 bounds. The MIV bounds tighten these inferences. As seen in Figure 4A percent of the food insecurity classi…cations may be in error.
Appendix Table 2 displays our sensitivity analysis for the average treatment e¤ect bounds illustrated in Figure 4 . The main conclusion from this table is that we can continue to identify AT E as strictly positive in most cases under the joint MTR-MTS-MIV assumption, at least for small degrees of food insecurity classi…cation error. As an exception, we cannot identify AT E as strictly positive if the threshold is excellent general health. Also, we cannot identify a strictly positive e¤ect for the baseline healthy weight outcome (BMI 85th percentile) under the food insecurity with hunger criterion. As before, the lower bound impacts of food security on health outcomes are relatively uninformative if the MTR assumption is discarded.
Our results demonstrate that uncertainty about the reliability of F S does not necessarily translate into symmetric uncertainty for policymakers regarding the e¢ cacy of improving food insecurity in promoting good health. Once we allow for the possibility of data errors in F S (q > 0), we …nd that the true impacts of food security on health outcomes may be considerably larger than would be estimated under the assumption of perfectly accurate data (q = 0). Conversely, our baseline results suggest that there is relatively little risk that researchers have overestimated the magnitudes of these health impacts.
This conclusion for policymakers is qualitatively consistent with the well-known attenuation bias result associated with classical measurement error in an explanatory variable. 16 In the context of the classical model, random mismeasurement of F S in a regression setting would result in a downward-biased estimate of food security on health due to negative correlation between reported food security status and the stochastic regression disturbance. In that case, the attenuation result would be driven by the strong "nondi¤erential errors" independence assumption embedded in the classical model that, conditional on F S , any measurement error in F S must be independent of health status, other conditioning variables of interest, and the regression disturbance. We obtain a similar attenuation result without imposing any of the parametric or distributional assumptions associated with the classical measurement error regression model.
Conclusion
Policymakers have long been concerned about the well-being of millions of children who grow up in food insecure households. Much of this concern arises from well-documented links between food insecurity and unfavorable health outcomes. In response, numerous e¤orts (e.g., SNAP) have been pursued with the goal of ensuring that all children live in food secure homes. While there is little debate that food secure children tend to have more favorable health outcomes, identifying the causal impacts of food security on health is problematic. Food insecurity is obviously not randomly assigned. Many household characteristics, including those unobserved in the data, might lead some children to be simultaneously at higher risk of being food insecure and of having poor health outcomes. Moreover, the potential for conceptual and practical errors in the measurement of food insecurity exacerbates a policymaker's uncertainty about the e¢ cacy of food assistance programs in fostering better health outcomes. Previous analyses of the role of food security for healthy outcomes have not addressed either of these important identi…cation issues.
In this paper, we used nonparametric bounding methods to reconsider what can be identi…ed about causal e¤ects of food security on children's health outcomes. We formally accounted for the uncertainty created by unobserved counterfactuals and potentially mismeasured food insecurity status. Even under the strong and implausible assumption of exogenous selection, we illustrate how the presence of very small degrees of classi…cation error in food security status can be su¢ cient to lose identi…cation of the sign of the average treatment e¤ect. Under relatively weak monotonicity assumptions, however, we can identify that food security has a statistically signi…cant positive impact on children's general health status, even with endogenous food security status.
We show that uncertainty about the reliability of the food security data need not translate into symmetric uncertainty for policymakers regarding the impact of food security on health outcomes.
Under the monotonicity assumptions, we …nd that allowing for the possibility of food security classi…cation errors opens up the possibility that the true impacts of food security on health outcomes may be considerably larger than estimated under the standard assumption of no errors. Conversely, there appears to be relatively little risk that researchers have systematically overestimated the magnitudes of these health impacts. A qualitatively similar attenuation bias result could be derived using classical measurement error assumptions. Unlike the classical model, however, our methods do not presume that measurement error is exogenous. Instead, we allow for the possibility that classi…cation errors are endogenously related to the true value of the potentially mismeasured food security variable or the health outcomes.
We suggest several areas for future research. First, the bounds in this analysis might be narrowed by imposing additional identifying assumptions. As one possibility, researchers might be willing to assume that at least some subset of the food security classi…cations are known to be accurate.
For example, one might be willing to "verify" that a household is truly food secure if it responds negatively to all 18 of the relevant food security questions in the CFSM. Similarly, a household might be veri…ed to be food insecure if responding a¢ rmatively to a large number of questions.
Second, future research on the mechanisms through which food security a¤ects health outcomes is warranted. Of particular import is disentangling the short-and long-run e¤ects of becoming food secure. Third, our analysis has presumed that health outcomes are accurately reported. While the height and weight status of children in the NHANES are objectively measured by trained personnel, the general health outcome relies on more subjective interpretations. The bounds in this analysis naturally widen if we allow for the possibility that both food security and health status are misclassi…ed.
Finally, we emphasize that our analysis is intended to isolate the impact of food security on health, not the impact of program participation on health. Therefore, our analysis cannot directly identify the health consequences of programs designed to alleviate food insecurity, like SNAP. Sharp 
